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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of antitrust and leniency programs in a repeated oligopoly
model outlined in Motta and Polo (2003). We extend their framework by including
the possibility of Type I judicial errors and pre-trial settlements. Through comparison
of our results to the earlier results we come to a number of novel conclusions. Firstly,
antitrust enforcement in the presence of judicial errors is less e¤ective and ex-ante
deterrence is weaker than was predicted by Motta and Polo (2003). Secondly, adverse
e¤ects of leniency programs are underestimated by the traditional approach, which
does not take Type I judicial errors into account.
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1 Introduction
Antitrust policies in the US and the EC currently include leniency programs as one of the key
ingredients. Leniency programs grant total or partial immunity from nes to cartel members
collaborating with the antitrust authority (AA) by revealing information about the cartel.
This revelation may take place ex-ante before any investigation by the AA starts, or ex-post
during an ongoing investigation. Leniency programs are based upon the economic principle
that rms, who broke the law, might report their illegal activities if given proper incentives.
E¤ective leniency programs might dissolve existing cartels or, even better, a priori deter such
illegal activities.
The US Department of Justice (1998) and Miller (2009) report some empirical evidence
in favor of the major modications of its leniency program in 1993. Despite this evidence,
Spagnolo (2007) asserts that the e¤ects of leniency programs are still not fully understood
theoretically. Our study belongs to a growing literature on the e¤ects of leniency programs
in antitrust. Optimal implementation of antitrust policy and leniency programs for cartel
enforcement have been analyzed in e.g. Motta and Polo (2003), Rey (2003), Spagnolo (2008),
Harrington (2008), Hinloopen (2003, 2006), Motchenkova (2004), Buccorossi and Spagnolo
(2006), Chen and Rey (2007), and Chen and Harrington (2007).
The above mentioned papers o¤er interesting insights on the e¤ects of leniency programs
on the behavior of colluding rms, but they do not consider judicial errors, which is the
main ingredient of our paper. Judicial errors and their reduction, i.e. accuracy, are a central
concern in law enforcement. They have been analyzed by Kaplow (1994), Kaplow and Shavell
(1994, 1996), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), Png (1986), and Tullock (1994) among others.
They focus on the negative impact of such errors on marginal deterrence. In this framework
accuracy is always desirable, and it is chosen optimally balancing the marginal benets and
costs.
Another stream of literature closely related to this issue is the literature on pre-trial
settlements and plea bargaining. There an individual is given the option to plead guilty in
exchange for a less harsh penalty rather than waiting for a court decision.1 Landes (1971)
indicates that empirical evidence shows that most cases are disposed of before trial by either
a guilty plea or a dismissal of the charges. He shows that the decision to settle or to go to trial
depends on the probability of conviction by trial, the severity of the crime, the availability
and productivity of the prosecutors and defendants resources, trial versus settlement cost
and attitudes towards risk. The main result of Landes (1971) is that plea bargaining reduces
prosecution cost. Landes neglects the implications of the possible existence of innocent de-
1Plea bargaining seems to be comparable to ex-post (after the start of an investigation) leniency ap-
plication. One di¤erence is that in leniency programs rms can also apply for leniency ex-ante, before an
investigation has started. Another di¤erence is that the rm only needs to plea guilty and does not need
to provide information about the crime supposedly committed, while in case of applying for leniency in a
leniency program rms are obliged to provide evidence.
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fendants. Grossman and Katz (1983) do take into account the possibility of having innocent
defendants and they use an objective function which incorporates the social disutility of pun-
ishing the innocent. They nd that plea bargains can act as an insurance device by insuring
society against possible erroneous outcomes in a courtroom. We also nd a similar result in
our paper. The other role it can play is a screening device. This is also implied in Kobayashi
and Lott (1996). The above mentioned papers examine a single-defendant setting, but there
are also studies on multi-defendant settlements, in which multiple defendants are charged
with the same crime and in which they can choose between settling or not. These models t
antitrust cases very well. Examples are Kobayashi (1992), Easaterbrook et al. (1980), and
Polinsky and Shavell (1981).
A more specic literature on competition policy enforcement has considered the e¤ects
of an inappropriate intervention by an AA. In the model of collusion Schinkel and Tuinstra
(2006) nd that the incidence of anti-competitive behavior increases in both types of enforce-
ment errors. Type II errors reduce expected nes, while Type I errors encourage industries
to collude when faced with the risk of false conviction. This leads to the conclusion that
antitrust policy, with non-negligible enforcement errors, can stie genuine competition. One
of the outcomes of our model also conrms this result. In Katsoulakos and Ulph (2009) a
welfare analysis of legal standard is developed, comparing per-se rules and discriminating
(e¤ect based) rules characterized by a lower probability of errors. The authors identify some
key elements that can help to choose the more appropriate legal standard and the cases in
which Type I and Type II accuracy is more desirable.
In the literature on enforcement errors and plea bargaining the enforcer balances the goal
of condemning the guilty agents and not condemning the innocent ones with the minimization
of resources devoted to enforcement. The problem of possibly condemning the innocent ones
(a Type I error) plays a vital role in this literature. In competition policy as a whole and
leniency programs specically, the problem of Type I error needs to be taken into account
as well. We extend the above mentioned literature by looking at how the impact of leniency
programs in antitrust enforcement would change if Type I judicial errors and the possibility
of pre-trial settlements and plea bargaining would be present. For this purpose we adopt
the repeated games framework outlined in Motta and Polo (2003) and extend it by relaxing
a number of assumptions. Motta and Polo (2003) were the rst to construct a dynamic
analytical framework for analysis of the e¤ects of reduced nes for rms cooperating with
the antitrust authorities. They show that, by reducing the expected nes, leniency programs
may induce a pro-collusive reaction. So if the recourses available to the AA are su¢ cient,
leniency programs should not be used. However, when the AA has limited resources, leniency
programs may be optimal in a second best perspective. Fine reductions when an investigation
is opened increase the probability of ex-post desistance and save resources of the AA, thereby
raising welfare. They also found that the optimal scheme is to give rms that collaborate, a
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full ne reduction and that a regime where rms are entitled to ne discounts even if they
reveal information after an inquiry is opened is better than a regime where rms can only
get a ne reduction if they reveal before an inquiry is opened.
Our paper extends the model by Motta and Polo (2003) by introducing the possibility
of having both Type I and Type II errors and by looking at the behavior of rms when
they could be wrongly convicted. We also include the possibility of pre-trial settlements.
We analyze an innitely repeated stage game between rms and the AA in the presence of
leniency programs. After the start of an investigation, colluding rms can use a leniency
program, reveal information, and pay a reduced ne. Or they can choose not to reveal, which
means they will go to trial and pay a full ne if convicted and pay nothing if acquitted.
Contrary to Motta and Polo (2003) we have two deviating strategies. If the AA starts
an investigation deviating rms can choose not to settle before the court and go to trial,
which means they will pay nothing if acquitted and pay a full ne if convicted (Type I
error). Or they can choose to make a settlement with the prosecutor by falsely pleading
guilty. If they choose to make a settlement they pay a negotiated sentence, which depends
on the bargaining power of the rm versus the bargaining power of the AA. The higher the
relative bargaining power of the rm the lower will be the expected negotiated sentence. This
negotiated sentence is assumed to be lower than the full ne but higher than the reduced ne
paid by colluding rms that reveal information.2 Deviating rms cant apply for a leniency
program since they cant provide evidence which proofs the existence of a cartel, so they can
only choose between pleading guilty and pleading not guilty.
We nd that for certain parameter values innocent rms, knowing they could be con-
victed, choose to make a settlement with the prosecutor by falsely pleading guilty in order
to avoid a possible higher ne. Hence, innocent rms may use pre-trial settlements as an
insurance device against possible Type I errors. Another nding is that, when the possibility
of Type I errors and pre-trial settlements is not taken into account the adverse e¤ects of
leniency programs may be underestimated. What is also found is that, compared to Motta
and Polo (2003) model, collusive equilibria become sustainable for a wider range of parame-
ter values. This means that the existence of Type I errors and the possibility to plead guilty
may make competition policy less e¤ective. This could be due to the fact that rms choose
to use collusion as a precautionary measure against a possible Type I error. This point is
also indicated by Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006).
The next section provides the model description. Section 3 looks at rmsdecisions.
Section 4 gives an overview of the results. Section 5 concludes.
2I.e. we assume that colluding rms prefer self-reporting and paying the reduced ne over pleading guilty
and paying the negotiated sentence.
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2 The Model
We analyze a group of perfectly symmetric rms. These rms choose between collusion or
competitive behavior, taking into account the enforcement activity of the antitrust authority
(AA). In the equilibrium analysis symmetric rms are considered: hence, all rms will choose
the same (collusive or deviating) strategy. The AA and courts are benevolent, but they may
commit errors. Following the literature, we can distinguish two types of errors: the enforcer
can erroneously ne the rm when it behaves competitively (Type I error) or mistakenly
acquit the colluding rm (Type II error). The AA chooses a certain enforcement policy,
which might entail the use of leniency programs. The content of the collusive agreement
prescribes both the market conduct and the behavior towards the AA. A cartel, for example,
may prescribe to its members to replicate the monopoly conguration and to refuse any
cooperation with the AA during the inquiries, or conversely, it may allow the members to
reveal information if the AA opens a review of the industry. Any rm, if monitored, can
choose between either settling before the court or going into trial. If pre-trial settlement
occurs, the rm pays a negotiated sentence.3
Now, rst, the policy choices of the AA are described, moving then to the rmsstrategies.
2.1 Enforcement choices
At t = 0 the AA sets the following four policy parameters.
- The full nes F 2 [0; F ] for rms that are convicted and have not cooperated with
the AA or did not settle before the court, where F is exogenously given by the law.
- The reduced nes R 2 [0; F ] specied by a leniency program together with the
eligibility conditions. All the rms that cooperate, even after an investigation is opened, can
be granted reduced nes R.
- The probability  2 [0; 1] that the rms are reviewed by the AA. This review stage
is the rst stage of an investigation.
- The probability p 2 [0; 1] that the AA successfully concludes the investigation when
rms do not cooperate or do not settle before the court.
When the AA is running an investigation it is able to collect and use evidence up to the
current period. Once the investigation is opened, the AA has to conclude it with a decision.
Extending the Motta and Polo (2003) framework we assume here that the AA can make
both Type I and Type II judicial errors: if an industry where rms are not colluding is
reviewed, the investigation still enters the prosecution stage. A review on colluding rms
can be ended in two ways: either some cartel member reveals information to the AA, in
which case the participants are found guilty with probability one (and there is no need to
3The size of this sentence is not endogenous in our model but it can be based on the bargaining power of
the rm versus the bargaining power of the antitrust authority. The higher the relative bargaining power of
the rm the lower will the expected negotiated sentence be.
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enter the prosecution stage), or nobody reveals information. In this case the AA has to go
on with the investigation, trying to prove the rms guilty, which occurs with probability p
(Type II errors might occur) and takes more time.4 A review of non-colluding rms can be
ended in two ways as well: either the rm settles before trial (for example, by making use of
plea bargaining) with negotiated sentence, N 2 (R;F ), smaller than full ne F (and there
is no need to enter the prosecution stage), or before court settlement does not succeed. In
this case the AA has to go on with the investigation. Then with probability p type I error
occurs and the innocent rm has to pay the full ne, and with probability (1   p) the true
state of the world (no collusion) is discovered. 5
The policy parameters are exogenous and once these are set the rms choose their strate-
gies.
2.2 Firmsstrategies
After the AA sets the policy parameters at t = 0, rms select a collusive strategy or a
deviating strategy at t = 1. They can choose between one of the following two collusive or
one of the following two deviating strategies.
- In the rst collusive strategy, CR (Collude and Reveal), rms collude from t = 1 on,
as long as no deviation occurs. If in period t no inquiry is opened, they realize collusive prots
M at the end of the period. If in period t the AA opens a review, rms reveal information,
pay the reduced ne R and are forced to non-cooperative pricing for the current period, with
competitive prots N < M . In t + 1, since no deviation from the equilibrium strategy
occurred, they go back to the collusive strategy.
- In the second collusive strategy, CNR (Collude and Not Reveal), rms collude from
t = 1 on, as long as no deviation occurs. If in period t no inquiry is opened, they realize
collusive prots M at the end of the period. If in period t a review is opened, they do
not reveal any information to the AA (which needs therefore another period to conclude the
investigation) and obtain collusive prots M . At t + 1, if they are proved guilty, they pay
the ne F and set competitive prices, with competitive prots N ; at t+2 they return back
to the collusive behavior.6 If at t+1 they are not proved guilty, they obtain collusive prots
4When the antitrust authority proves rms guilty, it is able to impose compliance in the current period, for
instance by imposing restrictions and remedies on rmsbehavior, e.g. competitive pricing. This temporary
desistance e¤ect of an adverse decision wants to capture the common fact that a guilty rm is often required
to produce reports to the antitrust authority for a certain period on its market strategies and is subject to
a light monitoring regime in that phase.
5The size of the negotiated sentence N 2 (R;F ) depends on the bargaining power of the AA versus the
bargaining power of the rm. Hence, the negotiated sentence N is not a policy parameter set by the AA.
The negotiated sentence N is assumed to be higher than the reduced ne R, since in order to be granted a
reduced ne R rms need to provide information which proves the existence of a cartel. This means leniency
programs, in which rms pay the reduced ne dominate settlements, in which rms pay the negotiated
sentence. Hence, colluding rms would prefer ling a leniency application over plea bargaining. Deviating
rms cant apply for leniency since they dont have information which proves the existence of a cartel.
6Similar assumption was adopted in Motta and Polo (2003).
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M and will go on colluding.
- In the rst deviating strategy, which is called DPG (Deviate and Plead Guilty), a
rm deviates from a collusive agreement at t = 1 and in period t the rm realizes a deviating
prot D (note D > M > N) at the end of the period. If in period t the AA opens a
review, the rm will plead guilty and pay the negotiated sentence N . From t + 1 on, since
deviation occurred there will be Nash punishment forever with competitive prots N and
if an inquiry is opened the rm will plead guilty, settle, and pay the negotiated sentence N .
- In the second deviating strategy, which is called DPNG (Deviate and Plead Not
guilty), a rm deviates from a collusive agreement in t = 1 and realizes deviating prot D
in period t and competitive prots N in all subsequent periods because of Nash punishment
by the other rms. If in period t an investigation is opened, the rm pleads not guilty
(pre-trial settlement does not occur), which means the AA needs another period to conclude
the investigation. In t + 1, if the rm is proved guilty, it pays the ne F and it will receive
competitive prot N . Starting at t + 2 this two stage game is repeated again, with the
di¤erence that the rst stage prot is given by competitive prot N and not deviating
prot D.
3 The rmsdecisions
Before we discuss the set-up outlined above we would like to relate our analysis to Motta and
Polo (2003). For comparison, their paper provides analysis of the two collusive strategies:
CR and CNR and one Deviating (D) strategy. This leads to three possible equilibrium
outcomes, which are: the Collude and Reveal (CR) equilibrium, in which rms choose to
collude and reveal if monitored, the Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) equilibrium, in which
rms choose to collude and not reveal if monitored and the No Collusion (NC) equilibrium,
in which rms choose deviation from a collusive agreement.
In our model, which includes judicial errors (both Type I and Type II) and pre-trial
settlement, the simple Deviating strategy is replaced by the two other possibilities. Hence,
the set of possible deviating equilibria will expand to the Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG)
and the Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) equilibria, in which a rm deviates and, if
monitored, respectively pleads guilty or not guilty.
3.1 Collusive strategies
3.1.1 CR: Collude and Reveal
When the collude and reveal strategy is chosen, rms collude in the market and reveal
information to the AA if a review is opened. The rms are reviewed with probability 
and, if monitored, they reveal and are forced to compete in the current period and pay the
reduced ne R; then, the game restarts. Following Motta and Polo (2003) the value of the
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collude and reveal strategy (VCR) is given by
VCR = (N  R) + (1  )(M) + VCR = M
1     
M   N +R
1   : (1)
Where M are the prots from collusion, N < M the non-cooperative prots obtained
during the compliance phase and  2 (0, 1) is the discount factor. The rst term corresponds
to the value of collusion in the standard case where no antitrust intervention is considered.
The value of collusion becomes smaller if there is antitrust investigation, which happens with
probability , due to two reasons: the rms pay the reduced ne R when found guilty, and
they have a prot loss M   N when the AA forces them to interrupt the collusive behavior
for the current period.
Next, we recall the condition, which is required for the existence of a CR equilibrium in
Motta and Polo (2003) under assumption that the AA does not make Type I errors. For
that Motta and Polo (2003) compare the value of the CR strategy (VCR) with the value of
the simple Deviating strategy (VD): VD = D +  N1  : The inequality VCR > VD implies
 < CR =
M   (1  )D   N
M   N +R : (2)
If this inequality holds, the CR strategy is preferred over the simple Deviating strategy.
3.1.2 CNR: Collude and not reveal
When the CNR strategy is chosen rms do not reveal if they are monitored, which happens
with probability . This means they continue colluding in the current period, while in the
next period they are condemned with probability p; in this case, they pay the full ne F and
behave non-cooperatively for the current period, while if not proved guilty collusion contin-
ues; after two periods the game restarts. If rms are not monitored in a CNR equilibrium,
some other industry will be reviewed and the AA will not open new reviews for two periods,
having to conclude the cases opened; hence, rms will have two periods of safe collusive
prots before the game restarts. The value of the game under a CNR strategy is therefore
VCNR = fM + [p(N   F ) + (1  p)M ]g+ (1  )(1 + )M + 2VCNR:
After rearranging the following value function is obtained:
VCNR =
M
1     p
(M   N + F )
1  2 : (3)
The standard cartel prots are reduced by the expected losses from antitrust enforcement,
where now the ex-ante probability of being ned is p.
Next, we nd the condition, which is needed for the existence of a CNR equilibrium.
Similarly to Motta and Polo (2003), we compare the value of the CNR strategy (VCNR) with
the value of the simple Deviating strategy (VD). The inequality VCNR > VD implies
 < CNR(p) =
(1 + )(M   (1  )D   N)
p(M   N + F ) : (4)
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Next, we determine when one of the collusive strategies dominates the other. For this
purpose the value functions of the two collusive strategies (VCNR and VCR) need to be
compared. The inequality VCNR > VCR leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 A Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) strategy is preferred over a Collude and Reveal
(CR) strategy, if the following inequality holds:
p < pCNR =
(1 + )(M   N +R)
(M   N + F ) : (5)
This condition states that if probability of conviction is high enough rms will have higher
incentives to self-report. Not surprisingly, the incentives to self-report are smaller when the
reduced ne (R) increases. Similarly to Motta and Polo (2003), this threshold divides the
region with collusive equilibria into two regions (the CNR and the CR equilibria).
3.2 Non-collusive strategies
3.2.1 DPG: Deviate and Plead Guilty
If a rm chooses the strategy DPG, it will deviate from a collusive agreement and receive
a onetime deviating prot D. If an investigation starts, which happens with probability
, the rm will plead guilty, settle before the court, and pay the negotiated sentence, N .
In all subsequent periods, there will be Nash punishment and the rm receives competitive
prots, N . Under this strategy, in the subgame after deviation, if an investigation starts,
the rm will always plead guilty and pay the negotiated sentence N . So the value of the
DPG strategy (VDPG) is
VDPG = (D  N) + (1  )D + VPG:
Where the value of a plead guilty (PG) strategy (VPG) in the subgame after deviation is
given by the following formula:
VPG = (N  N) + (1  )N + VPG = N
1     
N
1   :
Substituting VPG into VDPG and rearranging VDPG we obtain the following value function:
VDPG = D   N + ( N
1     
N
1   ) = D +
1
1   (N   N): (6)
Here, the expression is composed of the one-time value of deviating in the current period,
the discounted future competitive prots less the discounted costs of paying the negotiated
sentence whenever the investigation is open. In order to determine when a DPG strategy is
preferred over the collusive strategies, the DPG value function (VDPG) needs to be compared
with the collusive value functions (VCR and VCNR).
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Lemma 2 A Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy is preferred over a Collude and
Reveal (CR) and a Collude and Not Reveal (CNR) strategy, respectively, if the following
inequalities hold:
 > DPG=CR =
M   (1  )D   N
M   N +R N (7)
 > DPG=CNR(p) =
(1 + )(M   (1  )D   N)
p(M   N + F )  (1 + )N : (8)
Proof. The conditions follow from the inequalities VDPG > VCR and VDPG > VCNR,
respectively.
These conditions imply that incentives to deviate and plea guilty increase when either
the negotiated sentence decreases or nes (both full and reduced) increase. Next, the condi-
tions needed for a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty strategy to be preferred over the collusive
strategies will be analyzed.
3.2.2 DPNG: Deviate and Plead Not Guilty
If a rm chooses the strategy DPNG it will receive a onetime deviating prot D and all
subsequent periods there will be Nash punishment with competitive prots N . If an inves-
tigation starts, which happens with probability , the rm chooses to plead not guilty, and
the AA needs another period to conclude the investigation. In this period the rm receives
competitive prots N and can be convicted with probability p (due to Type I error), in
which case it has to pay the ne F . After two periods the game restarts. The value of the
game if a rm chooses the strategy DPNG will be as follows
VDPNG = fD + [p(N   F ) + (1  p)N ]g+ (1  )(D + N) + 2VPNG:
Where the value of a plead not guilty (PNG) strategy (VPNG) in the subgame after deviation
is given by the following formula
VPNG = fN+[p(N F )+(1 p)N ]g+(1 )(N+N)+2VPNG = N
1   p
F
1  2 :
After substituting VPNG into VDPNG and rearranging the following function is obtained
VDPNG = D + N   pF + 2( N
1     p
F
1  2 ) = D +
N
1     p
F
1  2 : (9)
Here, the expression is composed of the one-time value of deviating in the current period,
the discounted future competitive prots less the discounted costs of paying the expected
ne. In order to determine when a DPNG strategy is preferred over the collusive strategies,
the DPNG value function (VDPNG) needs to be compared with the collusive value functions
(VCR and VCNR).
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Lemma 3 A Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy is preferred over a Collude
and Not Reveal (CNR) and a Collude and Reveal (CR) strategy, respectively, if the following
inequalities hold:
 > DPNG=CNR(p) =
(1 + )(M   (1  )D   N)
p(M   N) (10)
 > DPNG=CR(p) =
(1 + )(M   (1  )D   N)
(1 + )(M   N +R)  pF : (11)
Proof. The conditions follow from the inequalities, VDPNG > VCNR and VDPNG > VCR;
respectively.
Condition (10) implies that the choice between DPNG and CNR strategies does not
depend on the ning system or the structure of the leniency program. While (11) implies
that incentives to deviate and plea not guilty increase when either the reduced ne increases
or the expected full ne decreases. Next, the condition needed for one deviating strategy to
be preferred over the other will be analyzed.
3.2.3 DPG vs. DPNG
In the subgame after the deviation rms either settle or they plead not guilty and investiga-
tion continues. In order to determine when one deviating strategy dominates the other, we
compare the value functions of the two deviating strategies (VDPNG and VDPG).
Lemma 4 In any subgame after deviation a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy
dominates a Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy if the following inequality holds
p < pDPNG =
(1 + )N
F
: (12)
Proof. The condition follows from the inequality VDPNG > VDPG.
From expression (12) it is clear that a reduction in the expected negotiated sentence will
result in higher incentive to plea guilty and lower incentive to plea not guilty. The inequality
(12) shows that threshold pDPNG(N) decreases if the negotiated sentence decreases. This
means the inequality becomes stricter and there are less incentives to plea not guilty and
more incentives to plea guilty. The analysis of Subgame Perfect Equilibria outcomes in this
model depends on the size of the negotiated sentence N . In the next section we look at the
distribution of equilibrium outcomes for three di¤erent levels of the size of the negotiated
sentence.
3.3 Determination of Subgame Perfect Equilibria
In the following lemma we derive the condition on N such that Figure 1 holds, i.e. the three
thresholds derived above in (7), (10), and (12) intersect in the same point. This level of the
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negotiated sentence is denoted by N and corresponds to the case of intermediate bargaining
power for the rm. It also appears that for N = N the pCNR threshold derived in Motta
and Polo (2003), recall expression (5), exactly coincides with the pDPNG threshold in (12).
Lemma 5 Plotting thresholds aDPG=CR, aDPNG=CNR(p); and pDPNG in the (p; ) diagram
implies that, when N = N = F (M N+R)
M N+F 2 (R;F ); all three thresholds intersect in the
same point (p; ) with p = pDPNG and  = aDPG=CR.
Proof. Recall expressions for pDPNG and aDPNG=CNR(p) in (12) and (10), respec-
tively. Substituting pDPNG into aDPNG=CNR(p) gives aDPNG=CNR(pDPNG) =
M (1 )D N
N
F
(M N ) .
Next, setting aDPG=CR(N) in (7) equal to aDPNG=CNR(pDPNG) gives:
M (1 )D N
M N+R N =
M (1 )D N
N
F
(M N ) : Solving this for N gives: N
 = F (M N+R)
M N+F < F:
Moreover pDPNG(N) =
(1+)(M N+R)
(M N+F ) is precisely equal to pCNR specied in (5).
As mentioned above the negotiated sentence N should always be larger than the reduced
ne R; otherwise settling is more attractive for colluding rms than application for leniency.
Clearly F (M N+R)
M N+F > R: Hence, N
 > R holds.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of Lemma 5 in (p; )  space; when N = N. This gure is
constructed for the parameter values: D = 2, M = 1, N = 0, F = 2, N = 23 and R = 0.
These parameters are roughly consistent with the current sentencing guidelines and the rules
of the US leniency program.
Figure 1. SPE when N = N*
The thresholds aDPNG=CNR(p), aDPG=CR, pDPNG and pCNR divide the space in the (,
p) diagram into four regions DPNG, DPG, CNR and CR. These areas indicate for which
parameter values it is optimal to choose one of the four strategies. A high probability of
being monitored () and a high probability of being convicted (p) lead to a Deviate and
Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy, while a high probability of being monitored () but a bit
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lower probability of being convicted (p) lead to a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG)
strategy. The strategy Collude and Reveal (CR) is chosen when the probability of being
monitored () is low but the probability of conviction (p) is high. The strategy Collude and
Not Reveal (CNR) is chosen when the probability of being monitored () is low and the
probability of conviction (p) is low.
If the bargaining power of the rm is relatively higher, the expected negotiated sentence
N will be lower than N. If N < N, thresholds pDPNG and aDPG=CR given by (12) and
(7) shift compared to the N = N case and the three thresholds (7), (10), and (12) will not
intersect in the same point anymore. In this case the aDPG=CNR(p) threshold will be needed
to indicate when a Deviate and Plead Guilty (DPG) strategy is preferred over a Collude
and Not Reveal (CNR) strategy. This situation is described in the following lemma and
illustrated in Figure 2.
Lemma 6 When N < N; plotting relevant thresholds in the (p; )   diagram implies
that the thresholds aDPNG=CNR(p) and aDPG=CNR(p) intersect at pDPNG and the thresholds
aDPG=CR and aDPG=CNR(p) intersect at pCNR. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Proof. Setting aDPNG=CNR(p) = aDPG=CNR(p) gives:
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N ) =
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N+F ) (1+)N .
Solving this for p gives: pDPNG =
(1+)N
F
:
Setting aDPG=CR = aDPG=CNR(p) gives:
M (1 )D N
M N+R N =
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N+F ) (1+)N : Solving
this for p gives: p = (1+)(M N+R)
(M N+F ) = pCNR:
This lemma analyzes the case when a rm has high bargaining power. This is illustrated
in Figure 2, which is constructed for the parameter values: D = 2, M = 1, N = 0, F = 2,
N = 0:6 and R = 0.
Figure 2. SPE when N < N*
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When N < N, due to a stronger bargaining position and a lower expected negotiated
sentence, the DPG area increases. This implies that the Deviate and Plea Guilty strategy
has become more attractive and it is sustainable for a bigger range of parameter values.
Moreover, the leftward shift of the pDPNG threshold and the downward shift of the aDPG=CR
threshold imply that the DPNG, CR and CNR strategies have become less attractive, since
they are sustainable for a smaller range of parameter values compared to Figure 1.
If the rm has a relatively lower bargaining power, the expected negotiated sentence N
will be higher than N. In this case thresholds pDPNG and aDPG=CR given by (12) and (7)
also shift compared to the N = N case and the three thresholds in (7), (10), and (12) do
not intersect in the same point anymore. In this case the aDPNG=CR(p) threshold will be
needed to indicate when a Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy is preferred over
a Collude and Reveal (CR) strategy. This situation is described in the following lemma and
illustrated in Figure 3.
Lemma 7 When N > N; plotting relevant thresholds in the (p; )  diagram implies that
the thresholds aDPNG=CNR(p) and aDPNG=CR(p) intersect at pCNR and the thresholds aDPG=CR
and aDPNG=CR(p) intersect at pDPNG.
Proof. Setting aDPNG=CNR(p) = aDPNG=CR(p) gives:
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N ) =
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
(1+)(M N+R) pF .
Next, solving for p gives pCNR =
(1+)(M N+R)
(M N+F ) :
Setting aDPG=CR = aDPNG=CR(p) gives:
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
(1+)(M N+R) pF =
M (1 )D N
M N+R N . Next,
solving for p gives: p = (1+)N
F
= pDPNG:
This lemma reects the case of low bargaining power for the rm. Figure 3 illustrates
the case of N > N and is constructed for the parameter values D = 2, M = 1, N = 0,
F = 2, N = 0:72 and R = 0. In this case the relative bargaining power of the rm is
lower than in the N = N case. Deviating rms have the option to plead guilty and pay
the negotiated sentence in order to avoid a Type I error, but since the negotiated sentence
is relatively high, the incentives to plea guilty are reduced and as a result the DPG area
shrinks and the DPNG and the CR areas expand. The CNR area stays the same. The
Deviate and Plead Not Guilty (DPNG) strategy now becomes more attractive. The CR
area increases as well since with a low bargaining power there are more incentives to choose
the strategy Collude and Reveal and pay the reduced ne R instead of the strategy Deviate
and Plead Guilty and pay the relatively higher negotiated sentence. This implies that the
adverse e¤ects of leniency programs are stronger, compared to the N = N case. As dened
in Motta and Polo (2003) the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs are indicated by the region
of parameter values, which induce CR under leniency programs, while without reduced nes
collusion would not occur. This increase in the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs is clearly
present, since part of the region of parameter values which corresponds to DPG equilibrium
in the N = N case now corresponds to CR equilibrium in the N > N case.
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Figure 3. SPE when N > N*
4 Results
Based on the above mentioned thresholds, for three di¤erent levels of the negotiated sentence,
we can determine for which parameter values the four di¤erent Subgame Perfect Equilibria
(DPNG, DPG, CNR and CR) are sustainable.
Proposition 8 In the repeated game played by the rms from t = 1 on, once the policy
parameters (F , R, , p) are set, we can describe the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) in
the (, p) space for three levels of the negotiated sentence (N) as follows:
- When N = N, DPG is the Pareto dominant SPE for  2 (DPG=CR(N); 1] and p 2
(pDPNG(N); 1], DPNG is the Pareto dominant SPE when  is above the locus DPNG=CNR(p)
and p is below the locus pDPNG(N), CR is the Pareto dominant SPE for  2 [0; DPG=CR(N))
and p 2 (pCNR; 1]; while the unique SPE is CNR otherwise.
- When N < N, DPG is the Pareto dominant SPE for  > maxfDPG=CR(N); DPG=CNR(p)g
and p > pDPNG(N), DPNG is the Pareto dominant SPE when  is above the locus DPNG=CNR(p)
and p is below the locus pDPNG(N), CR is the Pareto dominant SPE for,  2 [0; DPG=CR(N))
and p 2 (pCNR; 1]; while the unique SPE is CNR otherwise.
- When N > N, DPG is the Pareto dominant SPE for,  2 (DPG=CR(N); 1] and p 2
(pDPNG(N); 1], DPNG is the Pareto dominant SPE for,  > maxfDPNG=CR(p); DPNG=CNR(p)g
and p is below the locus pDPNG(N), CNR is the Pareto dominant SPE when  is below the
locus DPNG=CNR(p) and p < pCNR, while the unique SPE is CR otherwise.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 1-7 and illustrated by gures 1, 2, and 3.
Proposition 8 identies the regions where the DPNG, DPG, CNR and CR equilibria exist,
for three di¤erent levels of the negotiated sentence (or bargaining power of the rm).
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In case of intermediate bargaining power (N = N) a high probability of investigation
() and a high probability of being convicted guilty (p) will lead to a DPG equilibrium and
a high probability of investigation () but a somewhat lower probability of being convicted
guilty (p) will lead to a DPNG equilibrium. This is to be expected since a high probability
of investigation,  > maxfDPNG=CNR(p); DPG=CR(N)g, leads to rms choosing a deviating
strategy. If the probability of being convicted is high as well (p > pDPNG(N)) a deviating
rm will choose to plead guilty in order to avoid having to pay a high ne in case of a Type I
error. However, if the probability of being convicted is somewhat lower the expected loss in
case of a Type I error will also be lower and a deviating rm will choose not to plead guilty.
A low probability of investigation () and a low probability of being convicted guilty
(p) will lead to a CNR equilibrium and a low probability of investigation () but a high
probability of being convicted guilty (p) will lead to a CR equilibrium. This follows from the
fact that a low probability of investigation,  < maxfDPNG=CNR(p); DPG=CR(N)g, leads
to a collusive strategy by rms. If the probability of being convicted (p) is low as well,
p < pCNR(R), rms may expect a Type II error and choose not to reveal in the subgame
after collusion. If the probability of being convicted is high, p > pCNR(R), rms will choose
to reveal in the subgame after collusion, meaning they apply for a leniency program in order
to avoid being punished.
If the rm has low bargaining power (N > N), the curves DPG=CR(N) and pDPNG(N)
will respectively shift up and to the right, making a DPG equilibrium sustainable for a smaller
range of parameter values and the DPNG and CR equilibria sustainable for a wider range of
parameter values. If the rm has high bargaining power (N < N) the DPG equilibrium is
sustainable for a wider range of parameter values and the DPNG, CNR and CR equilibria
are sustainable for a smaller range of parameter values. So the relative bargaining power of
the rms inuences the conditions needed for the existence of the equilibria. This leads us
to the following proposition.
Proposition 9 For given N , the DPG equilibrium exists when  > DPG=CR(N) and p >
pDPNG(N):When the size of the negotiated sentence (N) decreases, the DPG equilibrium
becomes sustainable for a wider range of parameter values.
Proof. First, consider the situation described in Figure 1, where N = N. Clearly, the
set of parameters, for which the DPG strategy can be sustained as a SPE, is non-empty.
Next, recall expressions (7) and (12) for thresholds DPG=CR(N) =
M (1 )D N
M N+R N and
pDPNG(N) =
(1+)N
F
: Clearly, when N decreases (N < N; see also Figure 2), threshold
DPG=CR(N) shifts down and threshold pDPNG(N) shifts to the left. This means the range
of parameters, for which the DPG strategy can be sustained as a SPE, expands.
This proposition implies that deviating rms may choose to plead guilty in order to avoid
being wrongly convicted, and the higher the relative bargaining power, i.e. the lower the
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expected negotiated sentence, the more incentive they have to do so. So plea bargaining
may be used as an insurance device against possible Type I errors. This conrms the result
obtained in di¤erent setting in Grossman and Katz (1993).
4.1 Comparison to Motta and Polo (2003)
The following gure compares the situation without Type I errors and pre-trial settlements,
as in Motta and Polo (2003), with the case in which Type I errors and pre-trial settlements
are included, as discussed in our model. The gure is constructed for the parameter values:
D = 2, M = 1, N = 0, F = 2, N = 23 and R = 0, but, obviously, results of this comparison
also hold in general setting whenever N = N.
Figure 4. Comparison of results
In the rst case, without Type I errors and pre-trial settlements, the regions with collusive
equilibria are marked CNR (1) and CR (1) and the rest is the no collusion (NC) region. After
including Type I errors and pre-trial settlements the regions with collusive equilibria expand
to CNR (2) and CR (2) and the region with the deviating equilibria shrinks and is divided
into DPG and DPNG regions. The following proposition can be derived from Figure 4.
Conclusion 10 The range of parameter values for which collusion can be sustainable ex-
pands after including Type I errors and pre-trial settlements.
Proof. This result follows directly from the fact that the locus DPNG=CNR(p) in
(10) is always above the locus CNR(p) given by (4). Consider
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N ) >
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N+F ) . For any p 2 (0; 1); the numerators of these two expressions are the
same, while the denominator of DPNG=CNR is always smaller than the denominator of CNR,
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due to F > 0. Next, it is straightforward to show that the locus DPG=CR in (7) is always
above the locus CR given by (2).
This proposition implies that rms are more inclined to choose collusion, when they know
there is a possibility that they will be wrongly convicted and they have the option to plead
guilty. This means that the existence of Type I errors and the option to settle before trial,
may make antitrust enforcement less e¤ective. This could be because rms use collusion as
a precautionary measure against a possible Type I error. Similar result was obtained in a
di¤erent framework by Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006).
Figure 4 also shows that after including Type I errors and possibility of pre-trial settle-
ments, region 1a changes to region 1b and region 2a changes to region 2b, with region 2a
being part of region 2b. As dened in Motta and Polo (2003), region 1 reects the adverse
e¤ects of leniency programs and region 2 reects the positive e¤ects of leniency programs.
Region 1 is a region of parameters, which induces collude and reveal strategy under leniency
programs, while without reduced nes collusion would be prevented. Region 2 is a region
of parameters for which the use of leniency programs allows to obtain ex-post desistance,
by inducing revelation and shortening the investigation. Figure 4 shows that both regions
expand compared to results in Motta and Polo (2003). This leads to the following result.
Conclusion 11 Exclusion of the possibility of Type I errors and pre-trial settlements implies
underestimation of the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs.
Proof. The proof can be visualized by looking at the areas of regions 1a and 1b
in Figure 4. Area 1b exceeds the area of region 1a. First we show that the slope of
DPNG=CNR(p) =
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N ) is always bigger (for the same values of p) than
the slope of CNR(p) =
(1+)(M (1 )D N )
p(M N+F ) . Di¤erentiating the above specied thresh-
olds w.r.t. p we obtain
@aDPNG=CNR(p)
@p
=  c 1
p2
and @aCNR(p)
@p
=  c0 1
p2
; respectively. Where
c = (1+)(M (1 )D N )
(M N ) and c
0 = (1+)(M (1 )D N )
(M N+F ) : c > c
0 hence
 c 1p2  >  c0 1p2 . This
implies that the area of region 1b exceeds the area of region 1a in Figure 4.
This result implies that the traditional approach of looking at the e¤ects of leniency
programs, which does not take into account the possibility of Type I errors and pre-trial
settlements, may underestimate the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs.
To summarize, incorporation of the important features of real practice like judicial errors
and pre-trial settlements in the innitely repeated game framework suggested in Motta and
Polo (2003) gives the following results. Firstly, we nd that for certain parameter values
innocent rms, knowing they could be convicted, choose to make a settlement with the
prosecutor by falsely pleading guilty in order to avoid a possible higher ne. This means
innocent rms may use pre-trial settlements as an insurance device against possible Type I
errors. Secondly, we conclude that antitrust enforcement in general is less e¤ective than was
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predicted by Motta and Polo (2003). When including the possibility of Type I error and plea
bargaining, collusive equilibria become sustainable for a wider range of parameter values.
This would also imply that the ex-ante deterrence is weaker than was estimated in Motta
and Polo (2003). Finally, as implied by Conclusion 11, adverse e¤ects of leniency programs
are also stronger than was predicted.
5 Conclusion
A lack of information makes competition policy enforcement very di¢ cult and can lead to
imperfect competition law enforcement (i.e. Type I errors - convicting innocent rms, or
Type II errors - acquitting rms that are in fact guilty). This study is an extension of
Motta and Polo (2003) model and looks at leniency programs, pre-trial settlements and
enforcement errors. Motta and Polo (2003) constructed a dynamic analytical framework to
nd out what the e¤ects of leniency programs are. They make the simplifying assumption
that if an industry where rms are not colluding is reviewed the investigation does not enter
the prosecution stage. Hence, innocent rms will never be prosecuted and therefore will
never be convicted. We extend their model by relaxing this assumption and capturing a
number of real practice features.
In particular, we include the possibility of prosecuting and convicting innocent rms and
the possibility to plead guilty. After the AA starts an investigation into the behavior of rms
that deviated from collusion, these rms choose between pleading guilty and pleading not
guilty. If a rm pleads not guilty it will be prosecuted and it pays a full ne if convicted and
it pays nothing if acquitted. If the rm pleads guilty it will pay a negotiated sentence which
is lower than the full ne. As in Motta and Polo (2003) colluding rms can choose between
revealing and not revealing. Revealing means they apply for a leniency program and pay a
reduced ne. If they do not reveal they will be prosecuted and pay a full ne if convicted
and pay nothing if acquitted.
When the model of Motta and Polo (2003) is compared with our extended model, it is
found that collusive equilibria become sustainable for a wider range of parameter values.
This means that the existence of Type I errors and the possibility of pre-trial settlements
may make antitrust enforcement less e¤ective. It is also shown that for certain parameter
values a Deviate and Plea Guilty equilibrium is sustainable and that rms that deviated
from collusion, choose to plead guilty more often if the negotiated sentence goes down. This
means that rms may use a plea bargain as an insurance device against a possible Type I
error. Another nding is that the traditional approach of looking at the e¤ects of leniency
programs may underestimate the adverse e¤ects of leniency programs.
Our ndings lead to the following policy implications. The rst best outcome for society
would be that rms deviate from collusion and plead not guilty and then get acquitted. The
probability of investigation needs to be set at a maximum level in order to achieve deviation.
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If the AA doesnt have the resources to investigate all industries and all rms, alternative
instruments like increasing nes can be considered. However, the ne and the probability of
conviction need to be high enough to achieve deviation but not that high that they lead to
innocent rms pleading guilty. Maximum increase in these two policy instruments may lead
to the second best outcome, in which rms deviate and plead guilty. If collusion couldnt be
prevented the best outcome will be that rms in the subgame after collusion reveal and pay
the reduced ne. To achieve this, the reduced ne needs to be minimized, i.e. set equal to
zero, which is also advocated in Motta and Polo (2003).
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